Sazetak

Abstract

Sada je vrijeme da svoju pažnju posvetimo zagonetnoj ličnosti Khayyama koji, ukoliko je površno shvaćen, čini se da predstavlja filozofsko gledište oprečno zbiljama zemlje poslanstva. Ipak, ukoliko se njegova djela, uključujući ona koja su posvećena filozofiji, detaljno prouče, on se nameće kao ličnost koja je mnogo sličnija Ibn Sinau nego Epikuru i skepticima antičkog doba. ’Umar ibn Ibrahim Khayyam (također poznat kao Khayyamî) Nayshapuri (439./1048.-526./1131.), na Zapadu jednostavno poznat kao Omar Khayyam, najpoznatiji je pjesnik Istoka na Zapadu, i zahvaljujući naporima povjesničara znanosti 19. st., kao što su Amélie Sédillot i Franz Woepke, a koje su slijedili mnogi znanstvenici 20. st., etabliran je kao jedan od najznačajnijih matematičara i astronoma srednjeg vijeka, i kao autor jedne od najvažnijih rasprava o algebri prije modernog doba, kao i opsežnog djela o kritici Euklidova postulata o paralelnim pravim. Prema tome, njegova reputacija uspostavljena je kao reputacija pjesnika i znanstvenika. Međutim, ono je što je manje poznato o njemu jeste njegov značaj u oblasti filozofije, i  njegova filozofska djela kojih je preostalo nekoliko, a koja na Okcidentu ni približno nisu cijenjena kao njegovi pjesnički ili naučni spisi, do te mjere da se jedva spominju u djelima o historiji islamske filozofije napisanim u Evropi. Često se zanemaruje činjenica da se u tradicionalnim islamskim izvorima on prvenstveno oslovljava kao filozof-naučnik.

Ključne riječi: Omar Khayyam, filozofija, matematika

Abstract

Islamski filozofi u srednjem vijeku nisu dijelili radikalnu sumnju sa europskim filozofima moderne glede naučnog karaktera metafizike. Iako su često zauzimali stavove koji bi se danas mogli smatrati „empirijskim“, te predvidjeli ključne sumnje takozvane „naučne revolucije“ 16. stoljeća, a koja je u konačnici dovela do isključenja metafizike iz porodice egzaktnih nauka, islamski filozofi su smatrali metafiziku, u svakom smislu, istinskim naučnim poduhvatom. Bez imalo oklijevanja na metafiziku su ukazivali uobičajenim pojmom koji se koristio za „nauku“ (‹ilm), te su je svrstavali kao dio sveukupne klasifikacije znanja zajedno sa disciplinama koje mi danas karakterišemo kao naučne; kao što su logika, filozofija prirode i matematika.

Keywords: Ibn Sina, metafizika,

Sažetak

Ono malo podataka o životu Abû Nasra al-Fârâbîja dolazi uglavnom od srednjovjekovnih arapskih biografa čiji rukopisi datiraju između četvrtog/desetog i sedmog/trinaestog stoljeća. Najraniji iskaz iz Ibn al-Nadîmovog  (u. 380/990) Kitâb al-fihrista daje samo oskudne podatke o al-Fârâbîjevom životu; kasnija izvješća dodat će na ovu osnovu opsežne popise njegovih spisa, podatke o njegovim učiteljima i učenicima i nekoliko anegdota čija je vjerodostojnost upitna. 2Al- Fârâbî je vjerovatno bio turskog podrijetla, rođen oko 257/870 u Fârâbu u Turkestanu. Iako su nam pojedinosti o al-Fârâbîjevom ranom obrazovanju prilično nepoznate, izvješća potvrđuju da je proučavao logiku kod kršćanskih učenjaka Yuhanne ibn Haylâna (u. 910) i Abû Bishr Matte (u. 940), jednog od prevoditelja Aristotelovih djela u arapski jezik. Budući da je Bagdadska škola bila glavni nasljednik u arapskom svijetu filozofskoj i medicinskoj tradiciji Aleksandrije, al-Fârâbîjeva povezanost s tim učiteljima oblikovala je jednu od najranijih veza između grčke filozofije i islamskog svijeta.

Ključne riječi: al-Farabi, srednjovjekovna filozofija

Abstract

In this paper I express certain views on the fundamental questions about religion placed in sociological and anthropological scientific optic reception, as they are presented almost in the school sense within contemporary tendencies of the development of a modern world whose character changes on a daily basis, and where religious communities within the same, at all levels of social and anthropological analysis become increasingly important factors in shaping everyday life. In this work, among other things, I would like to point out some fundamental differences and convergences between sociology and anthropology of religion, where some of the most important and frequent definitions of religion created in these scientific disciplines are   poorly shown. The principle thesis could be sublimed in the fact that one should start with the research of religion multidisciplinary and multidimensionally. Considering the type of work, and having in mind more extensive and lateral starting points, standpoints and definitions could not be consciously involved. This paper consists of the introductory part, four chapters and  conclusion.

Key words: sociology of religion, anthropology of religion, religious pluralism, secularization

Abstract

In this paper I analyse the relationship between Avicenna’s ‘empiricism’ in his Kitāb al-Burhān and his metaphysics as it is described in Kitāb al-Shifā al- Ilahiyyāt and in Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa’l-Tanbīhāt. My idea is that even if the notions of ‘induction’ and ‘experience’ play a very important role in Avicenna’s philosophical system, these notions have no significance within metaphysics as science of being qua being. In fact, the metaphysical principles established on the consideration of existence secure empiricism in natural sciences from any sort of sceptical doubt. Amongst these principles the most important for natural sciences is the principle of causation, which is implied by the a priori notion of ‘existence’, and by its most general division between necessary and contingent. In this sense metaphysics is not in need for natural sciences in order to achieve its ultimate goal – to prove God’s existence. Instead, metaphysics cooperates with natural sciences in order to explain the relationship between the world and its ultimate cause. Natural sciences, on the other hand, are in need of metaphysics to secure their subject matter. In any case, both metaphysics and natural sciences must rely on each other in order to provide the complete scientific picture of the world. 

Keywords: Avicenna, empiricism, experience, metaphysics, apriorism, existence

Abstract

The main purpose of this work is to explain the significance of the relationship between al-Fârâbî and Maimonides, and to analyze those concepts that represent the intersection of their teachings. By insight into this issue, we are trying to determine the main guidelines, problems, tendencies and sources of Arab-Islamic philosophy. In addition, the paper tries to point out the irrefutable link between the two philosophers, as well as the  direct and undeniable al-Fârâbî’s influence on shaping the main ideas of Maimonides’ philosophy, which is particularly pronounced in his understanding and determination of happiness. The paper also strives to prove that Maimonides fully assumes and greatly takes over al-Fârâbî’s philosophical project, only within the framework of the Hebrew spiritual tradition.

Keywords: Maimonides, al-Fârâbî, islamic philosophy, religion, absolute happiness

Abstract

Sadra Shirazi philosophy represents the highlight of the late Muslim philosophical views. Although the philosopher of Shiraz deals with the problems of epistemology, theology and psychology, ontology figures as a determining field, and the conclusions reached by Mulla Sadr strongly impli- cate other areas of philosophical interest. The subject of the analysis of this work will be the fundamental settings of Shiraz ontology, whereby I mean the idea of the principiality of being (asalah al-wujud), the problem of syste- matic ambiguity and gradation of being (tashkik al-wujud), and the question of the transcendent unity of being (wahdah al-wujud).

Key words: ontology, being, principiality, gradation of being, transcenden- tal unity of being

Abstract

Supreme Wisdom is the name of the main Mullā Sadra work (al-Ḥikma al-muta’āliya), because this great philosopher and gnostic thought that philosophy is only a prerequisite for the preparation of winding up to the highest and deepest cognitions. One can say that only by the gnostic complement can philosophy (falsafa) be turned into wisdom (ḥikma), and that this wisdom will be the supreme wisdom (al-ḥikma al-muta’āliya). All three main dimensions of his thought - ontology, epistemology, and the doctrine of the soul - have an essential foundation in the Gnostic cognition that deserves the title of sublime wisdom.

Mullā Ṣadrā  begins the construction of his original ontology with the criticism of the doctrines of philosophers (primarily Avicenna and Suhrawardī), who hold that being is something that contributes to quiddity in one way or another (Avicenna), ie being is only the construct of our mind (Suhrawardī). He actually inverts such a theory, proving that only what truly is represents being, and its ‘transmission’ into the mind, changes its ontological ‘truth’, meaning its reality. The ultimate consequence of this doctrine is that being can not truly be understood by the mind, but only by direct contemplation.

Key words: philosophy, gnosis, ontology, epistemology, doctrine of soul.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND GNOSTIC THOUGHT OF MULLA SADR

THE ONTOLOGY OF MULLA SADR SHIRAZI

A CONTRIBUTION TO UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AL-FARABI AND MAIMONIDES

EMPIRICISM AND METAPHYSICS: A FUNDAMENTAL RELATION FOR FOUNDING PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE IN AVICENNA

RELIGION IN SOCIOLOGICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL TERMS: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS

AL-FÂRÂBÎ

ESTABLISHMENT OF METAPHYSICS AS A SCIENCE

’UMAR KHAYYAM AS PHILOSOPHER

PROPHETIC NICHE IN THE VIRTOUS CITY