Sazetak

Abstract

In this paper I analyse the relationship between Avicenna’s ‘empiricism’ in his Kitāb al-Burhān and his metaphysics as it is described in Kitāb al-Shifā al- Ilahiyyāt and in Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa’l-Tanbīhāt. My idea is that even if the notions of ‘induction’ and ‘experience’ play a very important role in Avicenna’s philosophical system, these notions have no significance within metaphysics as science of being qua being. In fact, the metaphysical principles established on the consideration of existence secure empiricism in natural sciences from any sort of sceptical doubt. Amongst these principles the most important for natural sciences is the principle of causation, which is implied by the a priori notion of ‘existence’, and by its most general division between necessary and contingent. In this sense metaphysics is not in need for natural sciences in order to achieve its ultimate goal – to prove God’s existence. Instead, metaphysics cooperates with natural sciences in order to explain the relationship between the world and its ultimate cause. Natural sciences, on the other hand, are in need of metaphysics to secure their subject matter. In any case, both metaphysics and natural sciences must rely on each other in order to provide the complete scientific picture of the world. 

Keywords: Avicenna, empiricism, experience, metaphysics, apriorism, existence